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Abstract
This paper attempts an analysis of  the mechanisms underlying the failure 
to communicate in L2 in university-level English conversation classes with 
unmotivated Japanese language learners despite the presence of  the instructor, by 
combining elements of  complexity theory and evolutionary game theory.  From 
complexity theory comes the concept of  fitness landscape; from evolutionary 
game theory comes the Prisoner’s Dilemma decision-making game between two 
rational players.  In conversation classes with unmotivated students, conditions 
conducive to Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions can occur, leading to L1, rather than 
the intended L2, usage during L2 conversation tasks.  In other words, cooperation 
emerges among students that is detrimental to the class goals.  The effects 
of  the Prisoner’s Dilemma can be minimized by reducing the shadow of  the 
future (relative importance of  future outcomes) and undermining the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma payoff  matrix.
1  Introduction
　 This paper attempts to combine elements of  complexity theory and 
evolutionary game theory to find the mechanisms underlying the lapse into L1 
communication among unmotivated students in Japanese university English 
conversation classes during conversation task activities.  The paper begins with 
a quick overview of  the lack of  motivation of  Japanese college students in 
English conversation classes, a description of  the fitness landscape concept 
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from complexity theory, and an explanation of  the Prisoner’s Dilemma from 
evolutionary game theory.  Then the possibility of  Prisoner’s Dilemma in classes 
is demonstrated.  This is followed by an exploration of  the consequences of  
Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions.  Finally a few words about alternative games to 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma are given.
2  Motivation in English Conversation Classes
　 One may often find that college students in Japan have a poor image among 
educators.  Clark (2010), a former president of  a Japanese university, began 
his opinion piece “Saving Japanese Universities” in The Japan Times with “The 
consensus says Japanese university students are lazy and apathetic.” Apple, Da 
Silva, and Fellner (2013) have edited a volume exceeding 300 pages devoted to the 
topic of  motivation and Japanese learners of  English, including at the university 
setting.  For example, Apple, Falout, and Hill (2013) researched Japanese science 
and engineering (S&E) college students and EFL, finding “The combination 
of  negative variables indicates that many S&E students in Japan are more likely 
than students of  other majors to have negative L2 learning experiences and a 
corresponding lack of  L2 motivation” (p. 56).  In comparison with classes for 
adult learners of  English, Berwick and Ross (1989) characterize university English 
classes as a “motivational wasteland” (p. 207), a result of  the entrance examination 
system through which students are often enrolled at “an institution and in a 
departmental major for which they have no special interest” (p. 207).  Burden 
(2002) refers to an “I’m poor at English” (p. 3) syndrome arising in part from a 
“lack of  perceived progress manifesting itself  in a majority of  students regarding 
themselves as beginners despite seven years of  instruction” (p. 9).  Though there 
are many instances of  highly motivated students and classes at the tertiary level, 
for the purposes of  this paper, the focus will be on college English conversation 
classes populated with many unmotivated students.
3  Fitness Landscapes
　 Various social groups, be they companies, clubs, or classes, have varying degrees 
of  efficiency depending on how the members interact with each other and with 
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the group context, such as rules, time limits, tasks, and the physical environment. 
With each configuration a social group may take a fitness value may be assigned. 
The set of  all configurations and their accompanying fitness values create an 
abstract landscape, used in complexity analyses, that features peaks of  high fitness 
and valleys of  low fitness: the fitness landscape (Kauffman, 1995, p. 26).  As 
interactions within the group (as well as with the external environment) change, 
the position of  the group on the landscape changes; the group’s configuration has 
changed and therefore its fitness value and position on the landscape changed. 
In this way the landscape is explored, with the group seeking fitness peaks.  This 
paper will look at fitness landscapes created from rewards and punishments 
(payoffs) received from interactions with classmates during conversation task 
activities.
4  The Prisoner’s Dilemma
　 Lindgren and Nordahl (1995) give a concise description of  the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma:
Two persons have been caught, suspected of  having committed a crime 
together.  Unless one of  them confesses, there is no evidence to sentence 
them.  The prosecutor offers a reward to the one that confesses; the 
other will in this case get a severe sentence.  If  both confess, they will be 
imprisoned, but for a shorter time.  If  they stay quiet, they will be released in 
the absence of  evidence. 
(Lindgren & Nordahl, 1995, p. 17)
　 The Prisoner’s Dilemma can be represented by a payoff  matrix (for example, 
in the upper left, if  both cooperate both players get rewarded 3 points, and in the 
lower right, if  they both defect they each get the punishment value of  1) (Axelrod, 
1984, p. 8):
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　 A simpler matrix (representing a player’s points depending on what he does 
and his partner does) is given by Skyrms (2014, p. 5):
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3 1
Defect 4 2
　 When the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a solitary encounter, the tendency is for 
both parties to defect, but when multiple, iterated encounters occur, cooperation 
emerges (Lindgren & Nordahl, 1995, p. 17).  Note that the payoff  matrix itself  
represents a simple two-dimensional fitness landscape.
5　The Prisoner’s Dilemma in the Classroom
　 The English conversation class of  unmotivated students has at least two 
superimposed, but diametrically opposed, fitness landscapes.  The first is the 
expected, conventional fitness landscape where speaking fluently in accurate 
English represents high fitness.  This is the view held by the instructor: students 
are evaluated on how close their fitness matches this ideal.  The other fitness 
landscape represents the values of  expending as little energy as possible, where 
speaking in English requires more energy than speaking in L1.  Low motivation 
Column Player
Cooperate Defect
Row 
Player
Cooperate R=3, R=3
Reward for mutual cooperation
S=0, T=5
Sucker’s payoff, and temptation 
to defect
Defect T=5, S=0
Temptation to defect and sucker’s 
payoff
P=1, P=1
Punishment for mutual defection
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leads to the dominance of  this second fitness landscape among students.
　 The classic prisoner’s dilemma is realized when a pair of  unmotivated 
students meet for the first time: neither can predict what the other partner will 
do during an English conversation pair activity.  Consider two students, A and B 
in an information gap activity where missing information is discovered through 
communication with each other.  Recall that the fitness landscape in operation 
during the activity is that of  expending as little energy as possible.  From the 
unmotivated student A’s perspective, the choices are (1) use L1 and B responds in 
L1, that is, mutual cooperation; (2) use L1 and B responds in L2, that is, B is the 
defector; (3) use L2 and B responds in L1, that is, A is the defector; and (4) use L2 
and B responds in L2, that is, mutual defection.  Each of  these situations will be 
examined in turn.
　 Situation (1) corresponds to both partners cooperating.  The cost of  
cooperating in L1 would be the possibility of  being caught by the instructor, or 
not learning the lesson about L2 conversation.  Both can lead to a lower evaluation 
in class, according to the conventional fitness landscape described previously: the 
instructor may deduct points from the pair, or they may do poorly on a subsequent 
test.  The benefits, on the other hand, include finishing the assigned task with the 
least effort (finding the missing information), and creating an understanding as co-
conspirators to subvert the instructor’s lesson.
　 Situation (2) has B defecting to L2; in order to receive a high payoff  
the instructor would have to notice B’s use of  L2.  By contrast, A would 
simultaneously be poorly evaluated for using L1 despite B’s L2 usage.  A may 
also feel chagrin at not being the first to defect in order to reap the reward of  the 
instructor’s admiration.  B will, however, incur the cost of  higher energy use as 
well as switching fitness models to conform with the instructor’s.  Alternatively, a 
high payoff  may come from B showing off  his or her L2 ability.  In any case, note 
that B’s defection does not imply sustained L2 usage; this is a single encounter 
result. (How multiple encounters, that is, the longitudinal results of  repeated 
interactions, will be treated in section 6.) Since low energy use is considered high 
fitness by the rest of  the class, B most likely will eventually revert to L1.  Situation 
(3) is the mirror of  situation (2); but here A is the defector.
　 In situation (4), both students are fulfilling the expectations of  the instructor 
as well as attaining the pedagogical goals of  the activity; however, since the low 
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energy fitness landscape is dominant, both students will feel like defectors in the 
eyes of  their fellow classmates.  Their feelings of  success would be much lower 
than if  they had both cooperated in L1, that is, as in situation (1).  They may 
experience negative emotions such as embarrassment or even fear of  teasing or 
ostracization from the others.
6　Possible Consequences of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
　 Having established the possibility of  the Prisoner’s Dilemma in the 
unmotivated conversation class, we may now turn to what consequences may 
entail.  Axelrod (1984) reported the results of  various strategies used in iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma computer simulation tournaments, where the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma encounter is repeated over 100 times.  This more closely approximates 
the classroom where student pairs continue their encounter several times while 
completing the subtasks of  a conversation activity; further, the same pair may be 
formed at other points during the semester or year.  Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
adds in the dimensions of  context and experience to strategies.
　 The strategy gaining the most points in an iterated tournament was TIT FOR 
TAT (Axelrod, 1984, p. 31).  This strategy simply copies the previous choice of  
the opponent partner.  Examples of  opposing strategies are DOWNING, which 
cooperates if  the partner responds, but otherwise defects (p. 34) and is based 
on observations of  human Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions; JOSS, a TIT FOR 
TAT variation that occasionally defects (p. 36); and FRIEDMAN, which employs 
“permanent retaliation” (p. 36) where if  the partner ever defects then FRIEDMAN 
will continue to defect.  The top scoring strategies have the characteristic of  being 
“nice” (p. 33), which amounts to not defecting first.  Another characteristic is that 
of  “forgiving” an act of  defection (p. 36, p. 44).  FRIEDMAN is not forgiving of  
any defections and was also a relatively low scorer.  TIT FOR TAT forgives easily 
for it will retaliate for a defection with a defection, but will not remember that 
defection.
　 In the classroom, with a fitness landscape favoring low energy, cooperation 
in the form of  L1 usage will emerge.  The top scorers in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma tournament were nice to each other, implying defections to L2 would 
be an infrequent occurrence.  Students copying each other (TIT FOR TAT) 
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will experience the greatest awards or benefits in conversation encounters. 
Occasionally or permanently defecting to L2 loses out in the long run of  iterated 
interactions.
　 Axelrod (1984) gives four suggestions in order to receive the greatest benefits 
in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
1．Don’t be envious (pp. 110―113). 
2．Don’t be the first to defect (pp. 113―117). 
3．Reciprocate both cooperation and defection (pp. 118―120). 
4．Don’t be too clever (pp. 120―123).
　 The envy suggestion (Axelrod, 1984) refers to Prisoner’s Dilemma not being 
a zero-sum game (pp. 110―113).  One can be successful even though one’s 
partner does better, as opposed to if  one’s partner is winning then one must be 
losing.  Thus, one’s partner may be quicker to cooperate in L1 but one will still 
reap the benefits of  lower energy L1 usage by following the partner.  Envy can 
lead to retaliatory defection, but at the cost of  expending more energy.  From the 
instructor’s point of  view, however, this is the preferred outcome.
　 Avoiding the initial defection (Axelrod, 1984) is related to being nice to the 
other and staying out of  costly retaliating conflicts (pp. 113―117).  Defections 
will face difficulty in a population of  partners using nice strategies.  According to 
Axelrod, “A population of  nice rules is the hardest type to invade because nice 
rules do so well with each other.  Furthermore, a population of  nice rules which 
can resist the invasion of  a single mutant rule can resist the invasion of  any cluster 
of  other rules” (p. 114).  A minority of  L2 users will have a hard time getting the 
rest of  the class to defect, to the regret of  the instructor.
　 The third suggestion (Axelrod, 1984) arises from the winning TIT FOR TAT 
strategy (pp. 118―120).  TIT FOR TAT represents a balance between punishing 
and forgiving defections and does well with other successful strategies.  It is not 
over-forgiving to avoid to being exploited.  In the low energy criteria fitness 
landscape environment, TIT FOR TAT is a simple strategy (the simplest in terms 
of  coding among the programs submitted to the Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament 
(Axelrod, 1984, p. 31).  It also is a good fit for students who value homogeneity 
and conflict avoidance (Cutrone, 2013, p. 14), to follow the lead of  their partner.
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　 Falling into the rut of  mutual defection (Axelrod, 1984, p. 120) was the fate 
of  Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament entries that employed sophisticated strategies. 
This would not be disadvantageous from the instructor’s vantage point, but low 
energy seeking students would not be candidates for devising such strategies for a 
conversation activity.  Clever strategies have the danger of  appearing completely 
random and consequently unresponsive to their partners (Axelrod, 1984, p. 122); 
cooperation would be difficult in this case.  It would be confusing if  a student 
seemed to randomly switch between L1 and L2.
7　Enhancing (or Diminishing) Cooperation
　 Axelrod (1984) gives suggestions on how to enhance cooperation among the 
participants in Prisoner’s Dilemma:
1．Enlarge the shadow of  the future (pp. 126―132). 
2．Change the payoffs (pp. 133―134). 
3．Teach people to care about each other (pp. 134―136). 
4．Teach reciprocity (pp. 136―139). 
5．Improve recognition abilities (pp. 139―141).
　 From the instructor’s point of  view, the goal would be to diminish cooperation 
in L1 among low motivation students in order to promote defection to L1.
　 The shadow of  the future refers to the relative importance of  future outcomes 
compared to the present (Axelrod, 1984, p. 126).  In the classroom, the payoff  
for defection decreases after each iteration since much of  it depends on the 
instructor’s attention to the student’s L2 usage in comparison to his or her 
partner; subsequent defections have less freshness and will seem more routine or 
mundane.  Cooperation is more likely when the shadow of  the future is large, for 
example, when one is likely to continue to interact with the same partner for a long 
time.  Students in classes with assigned seating and therefore unchanging partners 
exemplify this case.  The shadow of  the future is small if  one’s partner is likely to 
change, making the present interaction more important than a future nonexistent 
one, as in the constant pairing changes in a line-up activity (Nation, 1989, p. 378).
　 To promote cooperation by changing the benefits or payoffs of  cooperating 
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or defecting, “［i］t is only necessary to make the long-term incentive for mutual 
cooperation greater than the short-term incentive for defection” (Axelrod, 1984, 
p. 134).  To achieve the opposite in low motivation classes, the instructor can, for 
example, make it clear that the long-term outcome of  cooperating in L1 would be 
lower grades.  Students can be monitored more closely through creative seating 
arrangements, or peer monitors, or voice recorders, to lessen the benefits of  
cooperating in L1.
　 Axelrod’s (1984) third suggestion is related to altruism.  Altruism is used in 
biological evolution to show how some members of  a group may sacrifice to 
promote the overall survival of  the group genes (p. 135).  The instructor can 
promote group activities which gives incentives for defection to L2 in order for 
the group to attain a reward.
　 The fourth suggestion recalls “an eye for an eye” strategy as opposed to 
the “golden rule” or unconditional cooperation (Axelrod, 1984, pp. 136―137). 
The golden rule invites exploitation by defectors, though pedagogically this is 
the preferred outcome.  Furthermore, Axelrod (1984) states, “［a］ community 
using strategies based upon reciprocity can actually police itself” (p. 138).  This 
characteristic will make it difficult for instructors to maintain L2 compliance.
　 The fifth suggestion concerns the ability to recognize strategies of  how a 
partner will cooperate or defect.  In terms of  recognizing defection, this is clear in 
language classes in the dichotomy of  L1 and L2.  The instructor as well needs the 
ability to recognize cooperation strategies in order to thwart them.
8　Alternatives to Prisoner’s Dilemma
　 Skyrms (2014) presents three different models of  cooperation in evolutionary 
game theory: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Prisoner’s Delight, and Stag Hunt.  The first 
was treated above; here, we will look at the latter two.  The payoff  matrices are as 
follows (p. 4).
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　 Skyrms (2014) gives the following example for Prisoner’s Delight:
Two men sit in a rowboat, one behind the other.  Each has a set of  oars. 
They have been out fishing, and a hot dinner awaits them across the lake.  If  
one doesn’t row for some reason, the other will row to get them there; if  one 
does row, the other prefers to row also to get home faster. ... Cooperation is 
easy. (Skyrms, 2014, p. 5)
　 In the Prisoner’s Delight, students in the class have fewer incentives to defect; 
the matrix indicates zero benefits for mutual defection.  For individual defection, 
a student may gain a payoff  as a way of  temporarily showing off  one’s L2 ability, 
but not as a sustained effort.  The Prisoner’s Delight can occur, for example, when 
the instructor guarantees full marks to all students regardless of  L2 performance; 
in this case, activity tasks can be easily and efficiently be completed in L1.
　 The stag hunt owes its name to a situation proposed in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
“Discourse on the Origin and Basis of  Inequality Among Men” (1754) where 
hunters must cooperate to get a stag and yet a hunter may defect and go after a 
lesser-valued hare.
　 The stag hunt features two equilibrium states, where both cooperate or 
neither cooperates (Skyrms, 2014, p. 31).  In a situation where peer monitoring 
is implemented, such as the Fishbowl activity (Klippel, 1984, p. 9), students 
would defect and use L2, or cooperate and say nothing.  The middle situations 
Prisoner’s Delight
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3 1
Defect 2 0
Stag Hunt
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3 1
Defect 2 2
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of  simultaneous L1 and L2 would be embarrassing for the interlocutors when 
observed by peers.
9  Conclusion
　 The instructor facing unmotivated students in a conversation class needs to 
have tools to address L1 usage during L2 conversation activities.  Understanding 
some of  the root causes of  the phenomenon can help.  This paper tried to show 
how the combination of  a low energy preference fitness landscape and the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma can explain the widespread use of  L1 among unmotivated 
students and give suggestions where L1 cooperation can be undermined.
　 One of  the easiest solutions to implement is to reduce the shadow of  the 
future, that is, to continually change pairings, or to continually change the conditions 
or contexts underlying the interactions to simulate initial meetings of  Prisoner’s 
Dilemma where participants are more likely to defect to L2.  Changing the payoff  
matrix to encourage defection is perhaps more difficult, but can be accomplished 
through increasing rewards and punishments, or increasing accountability through 
some type of  monitoring.
　 Research on the effects of  the Prisoner’s Dilemma show that cooperation 
can arise without any central authority or other coordinated action.  When 
underpinned with the wrong fitness landscape, the pedagogical environment can 
be degraded.
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